Southeast Europe. Finally, there is another
case from Southeast Europe, where a large
development agency was planning a substantial project in support of rural reconstruction.
The funding timetable was set and required
tight coordination of the various aspects
of the project if the ambitious goals were to
be achieved. Should the whole project be
delayed, risking a reduction of the impact, or
even a total loss of financial support, to allow
12 months and a lot of money for mine clearance of affected areas? Or, should the minecontaminated areas suffer “double jeopardy”
by being excluded from the development
funding in order to keep the rest of the project
on track and on budget?
Linking mine action and development
may offer a potential solution that is outside
the usual way of working and prioritizing of
demining: gradual clearance, which aims to
clear just enough land, just in time, to ensure
that key intermediate development goals of
the overall large project can be met. One part
of the project, for example, building up a goat
farm, was planned to take several years, but
the necessary land was mined. Immediate demining of access routes and the key buildings was needed so that the infrastructure

could be rehabilitated before the project
started. Demining of the first part of the pasture could, if necessary, wait a year. Clearing
further buildings would take a little longer, but finally, as the herd of goats gradually increased, the rest of the pasture would
be cleared. This all makes for slow, inefficient
and hence relatively expensive demining, but
the overall gains in development activities
could be considerable. In this approach, prioritization and task planning for mine clearance would be dominated by the development
project and its time frame and not by demining or LIS criteria.
Conclusion
Many approaches exist concerning demining and its connection to development within
affected communities. Clearance projects can
be successfully completed, but afterward the
cleared land remains unused, as no development program exists to assist the community
in rebuilding what was lost through war and
violence. Linking MA and development helps
to ensure that clearance projects in mined
communities are not in vain by approaching
the process in a new, more integrated way.
See Endnotes, page 110
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Injury, Fire, Lack of Funding Complicate Demining in Lebanon
While most of the immediate landmine danger has been removed from southern Lebanon along its border with Israel, multiple
factors have complicated the demining process throughout the country. In southern Lebanon, 43 percent of the contaminated
land has been fully cleared, while another 49 percent was surface-cleared, according to the Mine Action Coordination Centre,
South Lebanon. UNMACC–SL has been a leading force in clearing mines in this area; however, because of a lack of funding,
many of its clearance teams stopped work at the end of August 2008. As a result, the injury rate is expected to escalate because, as in the past, locals will likely attempt to remove contaminants themselves when they face a lack of assistance.
In late July 2008, a Lebanese citizen, Abbas Akout, working with the Mines Advisory Group, was injured by a cluster bomb that
detonated near him while he was attempting to disarm landmines in Zwatar, a village in southern Lebanon. The cluster bomb
was identified as one of the bombs dropped by Israel in southern Lebanon during 2006. Akout sustained moderate damage to
his hands and feet. More than 50 Lebanese and international workers, as well as over 250 civilians, have already been injured
by these cluster bombs.
Also in July, emergency crews fighting a forest fire in the Bmikin region of Lebanon faced a unique challenge: extinguishing a
fire in an area where cluster munitions from the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict of 2006, as well as landmines from the Lebanese Civil
War, were still polluting the land. The resulting explosions and decreased safety of the area caused several hectares of forest
(one hectare equals approximately 2.5 acres) to be destroyed before the fire was eventually extinguished.

United Nations
The U.N. has indicated that the demining operations in Lebanon may need to be eliminated without extra funding. The U.S.
Department of State has given an initial sum of US$825,000 and is working with the American Task Force in Lebanon in the search for
additional funding to keep the program afloat.
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On 30 May 2008, the international community adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions.1 It is little wonder that those who were against a convention of this sort are still reeling from the shock of it. Africa, on the
other hand, can give itself a well-deserved pat on the back for having played a pivotal role in the adoption of
a groundbreaking, legally-binding instrument of which posterity will judge the results.
by Sheila Mweemba [ Zambia Mine Action Centre ]

A

t the first meeting of the cluster-ban process in Oslo, Norway,
in February 2007, there were four African countries present:
Angola, Egypt, Mozambique and South Africa. Only three
states, however, signed the Oslo Declaration at the end of the conference: Angola, Mozambique and South Africa. A little over a year ago, at
the Lima Conference on Cluster Munitions, Africa’s participation in the
Oslo Process2 began in earnest. There were 14 states present, and consistent with the continent’s overall stance on general and complete disarmament, these states spoke out against the dreadful weapons.
Thereafter, more African countries began to participate in the cause.
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia
became actively engaged in the Oslo Process. At the Livingstone African
Conference on Cluster Munitions, held from 31 March to 1 April 2008,
in Livingstone, Zambia, the countries of Libya, Namibia and Tunisia,
never before part of the process, were in attendance. Thirty-nine African
countries declared that the continent neither wanted the “continued uncontrolled proliferation of destructive weapons” on the continent nor to be the
“dumping ground for weapons obsolete in other parts of the world.”3
Africa’s Expectations for the CCM Negotiations
For Africa, the Convention on Cluster Munitions would address the
negative humanitarian effects of these weapons. Since the continent
is already plagued by crises—including inadequate health care and a
lack of financial, technological and human-resource capacities—it was
imperative that strong language be included, particularly on definitions,
victim assistance and international cooperation and assistance (i.e.,
Articles 2, 5 and 6 respectively of the Convention on Cluster Munitions).
Africa, in its deliberations during the Dublin Diplomatic Conference
held in Ireland, felt that assistance in whatever form—technical, financial or human—was vital, especially for poor countries that lack these
capacities. In addition, African representatives wanted to avoid the
inclusion of a clause permitting a transition period or any tolerance of
interoperability language (i.e., joint military operations with countries
not adhering to the ban).
After a position was determined, the 38 participating African countries present spoke as one through Zambia. Four African states (Egypt,
Eritrea, Ethiopia and Libya) also participated as observers, attending
meetings and expressing their own views. Strategy meetings were held
every day during lunch breaks and served as an opportunity for information exchange and feedback. Zambia, as the coordinator, had assigned
different countries to take the lead for the African Group in different
parallel informal sessions and report back to the full group meetings.
For instance, Malawi was the lead for Article 21 (interoperability), Sierra
Leone for Article 5 (victim assistance), Ghana for Article 2 (definitions)

Cluster Munition Coalition campaign workshop held prior to the official Kampala Conference. North African CMC campaigners Ayman Sorour of Protection (Egypt), left, and Rachid
Dahmani of Handicap International–Algeria.
All photos courtesy of Mary Wareham

and Uganda for Article 4 (clearance) discussions. This system allowed
Africa to be well represented and have its views effectively expressed.
Definitions. At the Livingstone Conference, Africa discussed contentious issues at length and agreed on common positions. On the issue
of definitions, the African consensus was that the draft convention to
be negotiated in Dublin should provide a categorical prohibition for the
stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions as a whole category, with no distinction over what type may be considered good or
bad. This approach was deemed critical to making an effective convention for the protection of civilians. It was argued that this strategy would
make cluster munitions a stigmatized weapon. Africa also preferred that
Article 2(c) be deleted from the draft, as its presence provided for an
opportunity for exceptions to be included.
In Livingstone, Africa (apart from South Africa, which highlighted
the military utility of the weapons in terms of their accuracy in pointtargeting) opted for a total ban on cluster munitions. In the African
view, no cluster munition causes acceptable harm to civilians. In
Dublin, however, a compromise was reached to limit exceptions—essentially banning about 98 percent of cluster munitions currently in use. It
was critical to Africa’s position that this compromise was not used to
exclude cluster munitions that had the same intolerable effects as cluster
12.2 | winter 2008/09 | the journal of ERW and mine action | editorial | 

munitions either at present or in the future. The burden of proof on why certain cluster munitions should be
exempted was to be on the states proposing the exemption.
Real evidence needed to be provided to prove that a particular weapon did not cause unacceptable harm to civilians during and after warfare. The focus was to remain on
the effects of the weapons.
Victim assistance. Article 5 of the CCM, which relates
to victim assistance, was also of great concern to Africa,
particularly to states such as Sierra Leone that have a number of cluster-munition victims. The African consensus in
Livingstone was that the draft text was strong and should
be maintained or strengthened further. It was also agreed
that reporting on victim-assistance programs should be
mandatory for States Parties of the CCM—unlike similar
humanitarian conventions that have left individual states
to implement victim-assistance programs according to
their capabilities (if at all). This has allowed states to either
not implement any programs or have ineffective programs
in place. The purpose of making assistance reporting mandatory is to ensure that victims are not forgotten as they
have been for so long.
It was essential that past users be held particularly
responsible for victim assistance. It was noted that, while
victim assistance would be the primary responsibility of
States Parties, international cooperation should be an integral part of their interventions.
International cooperation and assistance. Article 5
ties in closely with Article 6, which addresses international cooperation and assistance. Africa called for strong
language to be reflected in Article 6, which would hold
past users liable for any clean-up in the territory where
they used the weapons. As expected, there was fierce
opposition to such language. The reality remains that
Africa lacks the capability to rid itself of these weapons
without external assistance. The lessons learned from
the shortcoming of such a lack of liability in the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention4 made it imperative to
hold past users liable in some way. The final language,
which only “strongly encourages” past users to assist, is
likely to have the same inadequacies as those of the Mine
Ban Convention; furthermore, complexities attached to
the appropriate methods of clearance that do not result
in negative environmental consequences make it imperative that assistance be provided. In Livingstone, it was
agreed that the CCM text needed to be strengthened in
accordance with international law by obliging past users
to provide financial, technical, material and human assistance to States Parties. In debating this article, Zambia
and a number of other states emphasized the need for this
inclusion in the final text. The provision of cooperation
and assistance was also to apply to clearance, victim assistance and risk education.
Interoperability. Of all the contentious issues,
that of interoperability was the most problematic.
Countries on the opposite side of the debate, such
as the United Kingdom and other NATO members,
argued for the need for specific text regarding States
Parties’ obligations in relation to the CCM during
joint-military operations with non-States Parties.
Article 21 will therefore be a thorn in of the side of the
African contingent supporting the CCM; Africa will
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the International Committee of the Red Cross
to ensure public awareness and support for the
CCM.7 Only South Africa expressed reservations as it was still in the process of reviewing
its own internal policies regarding the matter.
The issue of banning cluster munitions has
also been taken up by the African Union, which
has urged its Member States to support the initiative.8 States that were not in Dublin for the
adoption of the CCM are also being encouraged
to get on board and be present for the signing
in Oslo in December 2008. With the extensive participation of Africa in the ban process
(if in Oslo 30 states sign and ratify the CCM
simultaneously, as some have indicated they
would endeavor to do), it would be enough
for the convention to enter into force by mid2009 even if no other states signed and ratified
it. During informal African contingent deliberations at the Dublin Conference, there were
suggestions that the group could even go a step
further and declare Africa a “cluster munitionsfree zone” by developing an African convention
banning the weapon on the continent.
See Endnotes, page 110
The views expressed in this article are the
views of the author and do not in any way represent the official view of the government of the
Republic of Zambia or the rest of Africa.

CMC campaign workshop in preparation for the Kampala Conference.

The Kampala Conference on Cluster Munitions was held at the Imperial Royal Hotel.

be watching closely to ensure clauses are not used as loopholes by States Parties
acting with non-States Parties. This issue will probably serve as the litmus test
of the credibility of the convention.
Transition periods. The draft CCM convention text of Article 21, the basis of the
negotiations in Dublin, did not allow for a transition period to use banned cluster
munitions, and the African delegation agreed that this language should be retained in
the final document. It was felt that allowing for a transition period would be defeating
the main purpose of the CCM, which was to ban cluster munitions.
The Outcome of the Negotiations
Most of Africa should have been ecstatic that at least one whole category of weapons affecting many African states had effectively been banned; however, this was not
so. African states at the Livingstone Conference, except for South Africa, wanted an
absolute ban on these weapons, which would most likely end up in their territories
that are prone to conflict and wars. The African consensus at the Dublin Conference,
however, was to approve a convention that banned as many of the currently used cluster munitions as possible. More importantly, Africa’s consolation upon reflection on
the process is that the use of cluster munitions is now effectively stigmatized.
Despite noticeable shortcomings in the final document, which the African contingent agreed to provided no other delegations reopen the text, Africa was pleased with
many provisions in the convention. African negotiators were particularly pleased
with the comprehensiveness of Article 5, which deals with the long-neglected issue
of victim assistance. In Livingstone, the African contingent was expected to set a
new standard that would look at the plight of the victims of explosive remnants of
war in general and cluster munitions in particular. States Parties would be required
to do more than ever for the victims of conflicts. To say that the final convention
language is ambitious is an understatement, and Africa is certainly satisfied with it.
Affected countries like Sierra Leone will undoubtedly be able to do more for their people because of this convention.

Developmental Impact
ERW contamination has an adverse impact
on development. Landmine and ERW contamination continues to be a major hindrance to
economic development on most of the African
continent; cluster munitions would exacerbate
this situation even further. Ethiopia and Eritrea
certainly face these challenges in their postconflict reconstruction. The one area in which
the weapons were used in Zambia remains contaminated and unutilized over 20 years after
munition deployment. Africa, therefore, could
not stress enough the necessity of international
cooperation and assistance and will use Article
6 as one measure of the convention’s success.
The omission of transition periods, though
not much of a bargaining chip, was a major consolation to African countries that felt that many
concessions had been given without reciprocal goodwill. Such a provision would have
permitted the continued use of cluster munitions after the convention had entered into
force, thus defeating the purpose of the ban.
The CCM is largely a convention on whose
final outcome Africa can proudly claim to have
had considerable influence. Africa had one of
the largest blocs at the Dublin Conference, and
therefore its position on any issue was critical.
Had Africa insisted on a total ban—a position
held by most Latin American and other lesserdeveloped countries—there would have been
a deadlock. This was an undesirable outcome,
which was avoided by the conference’s Irish

Presidency, by holding several informal consultations on the sidelines with all participants,
including African states. That in less than two
years, the Oslo Process was able to achieve
what the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons5 had failed to do in almost a decade
is a great accomplishment in itself.
Which Way Forward?
What remains to be seen is how well implementation of the convention will turn out.
Africa, for its part, remains determined to
continue leading, ensuring that momentum is
maintained and that national implementation
measures are put in place well before entry into
force of the CCM. To this end, a second African
conference on cluster munitions was held in
Kampala, Uganda, 29–30 September 2008.6
At the end of the two-day meeting, the
Kampala Action Plan was adopted by acclamation by the over 40 African countries present. The Kampala Action Plan prescribes a
number of actions the states are encouraged
to undertake before and after the Oslo Signing
Conference scheduled for 2–4 December 2008.
All the states agree to travel to Oslo to sign
the CCM, to publically signal their intent to
sign, to ratify the CCM as soon as possible, to
immediately undertake interim internal measures to ensure the effective implementation
of the Convention, and to engage civil society,
nongovernmental organizations and international agencies such as the United Nations and
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